Spreading Democracy Everywhere But Here: The Unlikely Prospect of Foreign National Defendants Asserting Treaty Violations in American Courts After \u3cem\u3eSanchez-Llamas v. Oregon\u3c/em\u3e and \u3cem\u3eMedellin v. Dretke\u3c/em\u3e by Miquelon-Weismann, Miriam F.
University of Massachusetts Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 1 Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law Article 1
January 2007
Spreading Democracy Everywhere But Here: The
Unlikely Prospect of Foreign National Defendants
Asserting Treaty Violations in American Courts
After Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Medellin v. Dretke
Miriam F. Miquelon-Weismann
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Massachusetts Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository @ University of Massachusetts School
of Law.
Recommended Citation
Miquelon-Weismann, Miriam F. (2007) "Spreading Democracy Everywhere But Here: The Unlikely Prospect of Foreign National
Defendants Asserting Treaty Violations in American Courts After Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Medellin v. Dretke," University of
Massachusetts Law Review: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umassd.edu/umlr/vol2/iss1/1
 
 
 
1 
SPREADING DEMOCRACY EVERYWHERE 
BUT HERE: THE UNLIKELY PROSPECT OF 
FOREIGN NATIONAL DEFENDANTS 
ASSERTING TREATY VIOLATIONS IN 
AMERICAN COURTS AFTER SANCHEZ-
LLAMAS v. OREGON AND MEDELLIN v. 
DRETKE 
 
MIRIAM F. MIQUELON WEISMANN* 
 
 
Neither can international institutional issues be treated 
as if they were exotic hot house flowers, rarely of 
relevance to domestic courts. Those issues, when 
relevant, must be briefed fully with the legal 
relationships between our Court, and say the 
International Court of Justice, comprehensively 
explained.**  
 - Justice Stephen Breyer 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
hree recent Supreme Court decisions underscore the 
continuing decisional confusion regarding the binding legal 
effect of international law in domestic state courts.  In 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Bustillo v. Johnson (companion 
case), and Medellin v Dretke, 1 the United States Supreme 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Business and Law, Suffolk University, Sawyer 
Business School, formerly Associate Professor, Southern New England 
School of Law and Director, Roundtable Symposium Law Journal. Co-
author CYBERCRIME: THE INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF 
A COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME  (Carolina Press, 2d ed.) (2006) and The 
Convention on Cybercrime:  A Harmonizing Implementation of 
International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process? 
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 329 (2005). 
** Remarks of Associate Justice Stephen Breyer, The American 
Society of International Law, 97th Annual Meeting (April 4, 2003). 
T
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Court sidestepped two legal questions: whether a defendant 
who is a foreign national may raise a claim, at trial or on 
appeal, that state officials violated the defendant’s Article 36 
rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations2 
(VCCR); and, whether orders entered against the United 
States, pursuant to the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice 3 (ICJ), are binding on domestic 
state courts. Instead of deciding these questions, the Supreme 
Court merely concluded that even “assuming” the existence 
of an individual right to assert a treaty claim, American 
courts can apply state procedural default rules to bar any 
remedy for the violation. 4 Further, the Court addressed only 
the binding effect of ICJ treaty interpretation on domestic 
courts, sidestepping the larger issue of the binding effect on 
domestic courts of ICJ orders, entered against the United 
States as a treaty member, under the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction. At the heart of the treaty dispute is the habitual 
domestic noncompliance with Article 36 of the VCCR, which 
requires state and federal law enforcement authorities to 
promptly advise a detained foreign national of his right to 
                                                                                                     
1 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006); Bustillo v. 
Johnson, No. 05-51 (companion case); and Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 
660 (2005), on remand Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L. 
3302639 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3398  (January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984).     
2 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1969) [hereinafter “VCCR”]. 
3 The International Court of Justice is a multinational body, operating 
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, that interprets and 
applies international law in cases within the ICJs jurisdiction. Under the 
Charter of the United Nations, “[a]ll Members of the United Nations are 
ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”  
Charter of the United Nations, Art. 93, 59 Stat. 1031, 1051, U.N.T.S. No. 
993.  The United States Senate consented to the Charter of the United 
Nations on July 28, 1945, 91 Cong. Rec. 8185, 8190, causing the United 
States to be a party to the Statute of the ICJ.  
4 In the Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo decisions, the Court “assumed 
without deciding” that Article 36 invested individuals with enforceable 
rights in American courts finding it “unnecessary to resolve the question” 
because petitioners were not entitled to relief on their claims.  Sanchez-
Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2677-78.  
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contact his consulate.5  International law recognizes that 
severing communications between a detained foreign national 
and his consulate may serve as an unlawful coercive measure 
used by law enforcement to extract confessions or obtain 
other incriminating evidence from an otherwise uninformed 
and legally disadvantaged suspect.6 
Seemingly, these three cases merely join a long list of 
unresolved predecessor criminal cases raising the same 
arguments in the context of the same treaty violation. 
However, there is one significant difference between these 
three cases and the cases that precede them.  Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in the individual cases of these 
three defendants, the ICJ entered an order against the United 
States, under its compulsory jurisdiction acceded to by the 
United States, adjudicating the rights of the same defendants.  
Specifically, the ICJ found that state authorities violated the 
Article 36 treaty rights of convicted foreign national 
                                                 
5 At least one scholar previously recognized the need for informing 
the legal issues in terms of the political consequences and made various 
recommendations in the hope of avoiding the inevitable collision between 
the United States and the International Court of Justice. See William 
Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of 
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND.  J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257 (1998).  
The true consequences of the political fallout could not have been 
anticipated until after the 2001 and 2004 ICJ opinions finally deciding the 
very legal issues avoided by the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas, 
Bustillo, and Medellin, respectively. Even the Supreme Court recognized 
that a final ICJ adjudication on the issues changed the legal playing field, 
distinguishing cases prior to the final adjudication by the ICJ. See 
Medellin, 544 U.S. at 665, n. 3.  
6 See Brief of Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2005) 
(Nos. 04-10566, 05-51) citing the U.S. Department of State Foreign 
Affairs Manual (1984), 7 FAM 411-14: 
Apart from ensuring the timely provision of legal 
information, prompt notification and access ‘is necessary to 
forestall physical abuse of the prisoner … or to ascertain when 
such abuse has occurred.’ American consuls are required to 
determine if there has been ‘any physical abuse or violation of 
rights’ and to look for signs of ill-treatment, bearing in mind 
that ‘many forms of physical abuse, including systematic 
torture, are calculated to leave no physical evidence.’ Id. 
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defendants in fifty-one capital cases, including the cases of 
Sanchez-Llamas, Bustillo and Medellin, and that all fifty-one 
defendants had the individual right to raise Article 36 
violations in their respective domestic criminal cases. The 
ICJ further ordered the United States to review the 
convictions and sentences of all fifty-one defendants and 
remediate the treaty violations in accordance with America’s 
international legal obligations under the VCCR.  The ICJ 
particularly warned the United States against applying 
domestic procedural default rules to bar remediation.  Thus, 
the ICJ guaranteed a detained foreign national defendant the 
legal right to raise this treaty violation in domestic criminal 
proceedings in the United States where the Supreme Court 
has yet to do so and in direct conflict with lower domestic 
court decisions.7  
In fact, the growing tension between the Supreme Court’s 
concern over federalist principles honoring the states’ 
autonomous rights to conduct criminal trials without undue 
federal interference and the binding effect of ICJ decisions in 
cases over which the ICJ clearly exercised compulsory 
jurisdiction, is palpable.8  Indeed, the Sanchez-Llamas, 
Bustillo and Medellin cases confronted the Supreme Court 
with the same legal issues that the ICJ had already resolved in 
cases where the United States was a member-party.9 Still, the 
Supreme Court chose to ignore ICJ orders and treaty 
interpretation in reaching its decisions.10 The reasons seem 
                                                 
7 Historically, those state courts that have previously considered this 
legal question decided, contrary to ICJ precedent, either that an Article 36 
violation does not create an individual right that a defendant may assert in 
a state criminal case, or assumed that if such a right existed, procedural 
default rules barred any remedy. Thus, state courts have held that there is 
no right and if there is, then there is no remedy.  See, e.g., Rocha v. State, 
16 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  
8 See Medellin, 544 U.S. at 683-84, (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
9 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) and Case 
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004  
I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31). 
10 In fact, the ICJ’s legal precedents were fully briefed and presented 
to the Court as central to the appellants’ argument. Brief of International 
Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2005) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51). 
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obvious. Arguably, any ruling in conformity with ICJ 
precedent would legally bind American courts, and to some 
extent American foreign policy, to the ICJ’s treaty 
interpretation.11  Additionally, any ruling in favor of ICJ 
precedent would expressly contradict prior federal and state 
court decisions.  Lastly, providing finality to the question 
would also force the Supreme Court into the seldom traveled 
arena of international law, a venue of unusual discomfort for 
the current Supreme Court.12  
Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the Medellin case 
to allow the Texas state court to consider the issues that it 
refused to decide. Not surprisingly, the Texas court merely 
shunned both the ICJ orders and the President’s commitment 
to the ICJ, binding state courts to follow these international 
orders.13 This led to a second ascent, in 2007, of the Medellin 
case to the Supreme Court’s doorstep.14 To add to the 
confusion, while the Medellin case was pending before the 
Texas court on remand, the Supreme Court ruled in Sanchez-
Llamas and Bustillo, deciding at least one of the issues it had 
earlier remanded for decision in Medellin.  Parenthetically, 
that ruling expressly contradicted the ICJ’s earlier order. 
                                                 
11 And so the United States has argued at length in the Medellin 
decision. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 693-94. 
12 The court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 
underscored the heated dispute between the justices about the role of 
international law in resolving domestic legal disputes. Indeed, Justice 
Breyer disagreed with his colleagues on the court who believe that 
comparative analysis of international and domestic law “is inappropriate 
to the task of interpreting the constitution, though it was of course quite 
relevant to the task of writing one.” Justice Breyer directly addresses the 
authority of the ICJ: “Neither can international institutional issues be 
treated as if they were exotic hot house flowers, rarely of relevance to 
domestic courts. Those issues, when relevant, must be briefed fully with 
the legal relationships between our Court, and say the International Court 
of Justice, comprehensively explained.”  Remarks of Associate Justice 
Stephen Breyer, The American Society of International Law, 97th Annual 
Meeting (April 4, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html (last visited April 27, 2007).  
13 Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).   
14 Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984). 
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The political pressure undoubtedly felt by the Supreme 
Court following the contentious foreign policy dispute that 
erupted between the United States and the ICJ as a result of 
the unfavorable ICJ decisions, may account for the Court’s 
reluctance to finally decide these thorny questions of 
international law.  While ICJ orders are technically binding 
only on the member-parties in the case before it,15 the 
language of the ICJ orders establishes clear international legal 
policy based on treaty interpretation certain to be invoked in 
future cases where the ICJ retains compulsory jurisdiction.  
The political knee-jerk reaction of the United States, in 
response to the unfavorable orders, was an unceremonious 
withdrawal in 2005 from the international protocol vesting 
compulsory jurisdiction in the ICJ to decide these issues.16  
The presidential caveat was a parting Memorandum 
committing American courts to abide only by the current ICJ 
orders.17  Those ICJ orders were then ignored by the Supreme 
Court in the three individual decisions, which served only to 
further intensify the debate in the state courts.  
To squarely address this decisional quagmire, this article 
examines the binding effect of ICJ orders, entered pursuant to 
its compulsory jurisdiction, on American courts; earlier 
decisions of the Supreme Court penalizing foreign nationals 
for failing to timely raise individual treaty claims; the effect 
on treaty enforcement in domestic courts after the executive 
branch’s recent foreign policy decision to withdraw from 
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction; the current policy disputes 
dividing the United States and the ICJ; and, the national 
interest, or lack thereof, in treaty compliance.    
This article concludes that the government’s current claim 
that a “long standing presumption” exists to prevent the 
assertion of individual rights under Article 36 is simply not 
                                                 
15 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 59, (June 26, 
1945), 59 Stat. 1062, 33 U.N.T.S. No 993 [hereinafter “Court’s Statute”].    
16 See discussion infra Section III. A. (discussing the withdrawal of 
the United States from the Protocol).  
17 President Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 
2005), App. To Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin v. 
Dretke, O.T. 2004, No. 04-5928, p. 9a. [hereinafter “Memorandum”]. 
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supported by international law or prior decisions of the 
Supreme Court.  It appears to be nothing more than a 
disingenuous effort to ground foreign policy and politics in 
decisional law.  However, even if the right exists, the recent 
exercise by the executive branch of its foreign policy 
prerogative in treaty negotiations may effectively prevent the 
judicial branch from deciding the remedial issue on other 
than a case by case basis.  Indeed, those Supreme Court 
Justices favoring recognition of an individual right to assert 
an Article 36 treaty violation remain curiously tight-lipped 
over the remedy.  In short, the political score between 
America and the ICJ will have to be settled before the 
Supreme Court is free to decide the issues which, 
parenthetically, have already been decided by the ICJ.  In any 
case, the Supreme Court needs to get back into the game.  
Justice Breyer’s observation about the need to integrate U.S. 
decisional law with the decisions of the ICJ, where 
appropriate, makes legal sense.18   
Finally, this article advocates that, as a matter of policy, 
there is a national interest in creating individually enforceable 
rights and domestic remedies to redress demonstrable treaty 
violations, particularly where American citizens may be 
subject to the same or similar treatment in foreign courts. 
Following the “Golden Rule” in American foreign policy and 
decisional law may provide predictable and consistent 
enforcement of individual treaty rights in American courts in 
the hope of securing the same fair treatment for American 
citizens abroad.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 In fact, it has become a legal necessity. On the subsequent remand 
of the Medellin case from the Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court 
refused to honor both the ICJ order and the presidential memorandum 
committing the states to comply with the ICJ order based on the principle 
of comity. It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court is now being 
asked to decide the issues on the second petition for writ of certiorari filed 
by Medellin, Ex Parte Medellin, supra note 14.  
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II. FRAMING THE LEGAL ISSUES 
 
A. Medellin v. Dretke 
 
Medellin, a Mexican national, confessed to participating 
in a capital offense that resulted in his conviction and the 
imposition of a death sentence.19 His conviction was affirmed 
on appeal. Subsequently, Medellin filed a state habeas corpus 
action raising for the first time the denial under Article 36 of 
his right to consular access under the VCCR. After 
exhausting state remedies, Medellin filed a similar habeas 
petition in the federal courts raising the same issue. While it 
was pending, the ICJ determined20 that the VCCR guaranteed 
individually enforceable rights in domestic proceedings and 
that the United States violated those rights. The ICJ further 
ordered the United States, in Medellin’s case and fifty others, 
to review the convictions and sentences without allowing 
state procedural default rules to bar such review.21  
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged but ignored 
the ICJ decision22 in Medellin and instead, ruled in 
conformity with an earlier Supreme Court decision in Breard 
v. Greene 
23 where state procedural default rules were applied 
to bar review and other prior Fifth Circuit decisions rejecting 
any individual rights to raise a treaty violation.24 After the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, President George W. Bush 
issued a memorandum committing domestic courts to follow 
the ICJ order in the fifty-one cases “in accordance with 
general principles of comity.”25 The Supreme Court, 
thereafter, granted certiorari to consider two questions in the 
Medellin case: first, whether a federal court is bound by the 
ICJ order ruling that domestic courts must review Medellin’s 
                                                 
19 Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 662 (2005). 
20 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, No.128 (Mar. 31). 
21 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 662-63. 
22 Id. at 663. 
23 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam). 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th 
Cir. 2001). 
25 Memorandum, supra note 17. 
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conviction under the VCCR without regard to procedural 
default rules; and second, whether a federal court should give 
legal effect, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform treaty 
interpretation, to the ICJ’s order.26  Instead of deciding these 
issues, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Texas 
court to rule in light of the ICJ order and the President’s 
Memorandum.27  However, the Court indulges in several 
pages of dicta commenting on the merits of the legal issues 
which “are not free from doubt”28 and even suggesting an 
avenue for a later appeal of the case “unencumbered by the 
issues that arise from the procedural posture of this action.”29  
The Court also cautioned that its decision in Breard was 
decided at a time when “we confronted no final ICJ 
adjudication.”30 
As discussed in further detail below,31 the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and ruled32 that the 
ICJ order was not binding federal law and thus, under Breard, 
did not preempt state procedural default rules barring 
review33 and that the President of the United States had 
exceeded his constitutional authority in binding domestic 
courts to ICJ orders.34  In response to this decision, Medellin 
filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court in 2007.35  
To further complicate matters, the Supreme Court ruled 
on several of the same issues in Sanchez-Lamas v. Oregon 
and Bustillo v. Johnson, while the Medellin case was on 
remand before the Texas Court of Appeals.36  
                                                 
26 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 661-62. 
27 Id. at 666-67. 
28 Id. at 664. 
29 Id. at 664, n.1. 
30 Id. at 665, n.3. 
31 See infra Section VI.D. 
32 Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L. 3302639 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006).   
33 Id. at 7-8. 
34 Id. at 19. 
35 Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984). 
36 Ex Parte Medellin, supra note 13. 
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B. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, and Bustillo v. 
Johnson (companion case) 
 
Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo were consolidated to decide 
three issues: first, whether Article 36 of the VCCR grants 
rights enforceable by individuals in domestic proceedings; 
second, whether an Article 36 claim can be barred by a state 
procedural default rule; and third, whether suppression of 
evidence is an appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation. 
The Supreme Court “assumed without deciding” that even if 
the VCCR created judicially enforceable rights, 37 
suppression of evidence was not an appropriate remedy for an 
Article 36 violation and that state procedural default rules 
barred relief.38  Significantly, the Court failed to decide 
whether ICJ orders, entered pursuant to its compulsory 
jurisdiction acceded to by the United States, were binding on 
domestic courts. Instead, it ruled that the VCCR did not 
expressly require suppression of evidence as a remedial 
measure and because the exclusionary rule was entirely an 
“American legal creation,” it had no application to the cases 
before the Court.39  While the Court acknowledged that 
domestic courts must apply the remedy afforded in a self-
executing treaty in the course of adjudicating litigants rights, 
it cautioned that, “where a treaty does not provide a particular 
remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for federal 
courts to impose one on the states through lawmaking of their 
own.”40  
The Court applied the same logic to the procedural 
default question.  Because the treaty allows the United States 
to implement ICJ orders “in conformity with the laws of the 
receiving states,” the state procedural default rules apply.41  
That reasoning, however, begs the central question of 
whether the ICJ orders are entitled to binding effect where 
                                                 
37 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2677 (2006) 
38 Id. at 2674. 
39 Id. at 2678. 
40 Id. at 2680. 
41 Id. at 2678. 
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state procedural default rules deny “full effect” to the 
implementation of a self-executing treaty.  That inherent 
clash of wills between the VCCR as a self-executing treaty 
and state procedural default rules barring relief, which rules 
the ICJ found impaired the United States’ international 
obligations to act in a manner that accords full effect to the 
treaty, remains chiefly unaddressed by the Supreme Court.42  
The political strain on the Court was apparent from the 
decision: “[W]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the 
meaning given them by the departments of government 
particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is 
given great weight.”43  However, rather than looking to the 
negotiating history of the VCCR and the past legal positions 
asserted by the United States in the ICJ with respect to the 
subject issues being decided by the Court, the Supreme Court 
chose merely to rely on the President’s 2005 memorandum 
for the short-sighted proposition that if the President 
authorized withdrawal from the treaty protocol and was 
unwilling to commit to the binding affect of ICJ orders on 
domestic courts, the Supreme Court was not in a position to 
second guess that political decision.44  This analysis of the 
government’s negotiating and enforcement position flies in 
the face of 46 years of participation by the United States in 
the VCCR and contradicts the actual legal positions asserted 
by it in the ICJ with respect to Article 36 violations.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 When confronted with the question, the Court merely stated that 
the “full effect” issue was not timely raised by the parties. Id. at 2685.   
43 Id. (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)). 
44 Id.  
45 This was particularly true during the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. 
See infra section V.  
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III. A LEGAL PROBLEM EMBEDDED IN A FOREIGN 
POLICY DISPUTE  
 
A. The Rift Between the United States and the 
International Court of Justice 
 
Ironically, the United States was the first country to 
herald the ICJ as the court with exclusive jurisdiction over 
Article 36 violations when, in 1979, it invoked the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ICJ over an Article 36 violation against a 
group of American citizens.46  As a matter of foreign policy 
and treaty negotiation, the decision to select the ICJ as the 
appropriate forum was in conformity with the 1969 
ratification of the VCCR,47 whereupon the United States also 
agreed to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes48 
[hereinafter “Protocol”]. Among other things, the Protocol is 
a forum selection clause that invests the ICJ with exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide treaty issues under the VCCR.49 
However, in recent years, after the ICJ repeatedly declared 
the United States in violation of the rights of foreign nationals 
under Article 36, America’s foreign and legal policies 
changed dramatically regarding the binding effect of ICJ 
decisions in its domestic courts and the continuing exercise of 
its compulsory jurisdiction over the United States.  
Indeed, the worst foreign policy trouble began in 2001, 
when the ICJ ruled that the United States violated Article 36 
in a case in which Germany and the United States were 
parties.50  There, the ICJ resolved the very legal issue that 
currently remains unresolved by the Supreme Court, namely, 
that Article 36 creates an individually enforceable treaty right 
                                                 
46 International Instruments, The International Justice Project, 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/nationalsInstruments.cfm (last 
visited April 27, 2007). 
47 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 3. 
48 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 
U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter “Protocol”]. 
49 See infra Section VII. B. 
50 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).  
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in the domestic courts of a member state, and where a 
defendant was not promptly advised of his Article 36 right, is 
later convicted and subject to a severe sentence, the United 
States “should allow review and reconsideration”51 of the 
sentence. 52  Matters further escalated when in 2004, in a case 
in which Mexico and the United States were parties, the ICJ 
again ruled that the United States was in violation of Article 
36 and ordered the United States to provide the same relief to 
convicted foreign nationals.53 
In direct response to the 2004 ICJ decision, the President 
of the United States issued a policy memorandum in February 
2005 stating that the United States would give effect to the 
2004 ICJ decision54 in accordance with general principles of 
comity in the individual cases then pending in American 
courts.55  However, one month later, in March 2005, while 
several unrelated cases raising the same Article 36 treaty 
violation were pending before the United States Supreme 
Court, the United States unceremoniously withdrew from the 
Protocol that it had signed 46 years earlier, repudiating the 
policy of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction under the VCCR and 
the Protocol.56  
                                                 
51 Previously, the ICJ had used the term “should” in its orders 
imposing remedial obligations to be followed by the United States. 
However, by the time it entered its order of provisional measures in 
Avena, the ICJ conspicuously changed the language of the remedial 
obligations of the United States to “shall.” This may certainly be 
interpreted as an attempt by the ICJ to bolster the binding effect of its 
decisions on the United States. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, et.al., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 138, n.3 
(Foundation Press 2004). 
52 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466 
53 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.128 (Mar. 31). 
54 Id. 
55 Memorandum, supra note 17. 
56 Statement by Dala Jordan, spokeswoman for the U.S. State 
Department, describing the need for withdrawal to “[protect] against 
future International Court of Justice judgments that might similarly 
interfere in ways we did not anticipate when we joined the optional 
protocol.”  U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. 
TIMES, (March 10, 2005), available at http://select.nytimes.com/search/ 
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To underscore the legal morass created by the foreign 
policy dispute with the ICJ, the Texas state court, reviewing 
the Medellin case on remand, flatly rejected the binding affect 
of the President’s Memorandum of February 2005 in which 
the President explicitly committed the courts of the United 
States to abide by ICJ legal precedent in respect to all 
pending cases affected by its decision.57  Not surprisingly, a 
petition for certiorari is currently pending in the Supreme 
Court in the Medellin case commencing its second ascent on 
the same legal issues.58   
 
B. The Supreme Court on the Sidelines 
 
It was against this foreign policy backdrop in 2006 that 
the Supreme Court was again confronted with a case raising 
the defense of an Article 36 treaty violation in a state criminal 
prosecution. Undoubtedly, the now contentious foreign policy 
dispute between the United States and the ICJ complicated 
the Supreme Court’s review of the same legal issue already 
adjudicated in those cases where the United States had 
voluntarily acceded to ICJ jurisdiction.  Faced with clear 
international treaty interpretation recognizing the individual 
right of a foreign national to raise the defense in domestic 
proceedings and the actual court orders issued by the ICJ,59 
the Supreme Court simply chose to sidestep the issue. 
Instead, the Court merely “assumed without deciding”60 that 
the particular defendants had the right to raise the Article 36 
treaty violation in their state criminal cases.  Then, to avoid 
any direct confrontation with the mandate of the ICJ to 
review any case where a significant incarceratory sentence 
                                                                                                     
restricted/article?res=FA0C16F63D580C738DDDAA0894DD404482 
(last visited April 27, 2007). 
57 Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L. 3302639 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2007).   
58 Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984). 
59 See infra Section VII.C. (discussing the question of the binding 
effect of ICJ decisions on American domestic courts). 
60 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2677-78 (2006).  
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was imposed despite the violation,61 the Supreme Court 
disingenuously echoed lower state court decisions rejecting 
suppression as a remedy in one case62 and concluded that the 
issue could not be raised belatedly on appeal in another.63 As 
a result of its rulings in the Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo 
cases, the Supreme Court foreclosed the use of the 
exclusionary rule as a domestic judicial remedy to vindicate 
violations of Article 36 in state court proceedings. 
The decisions are disconcerting because the Supreme 
Court ruled on the applicability of domestic legal remedies 
without first resolving the very existence or nature of the 
right sought to be vindicated and with complete indifference 
to international legal precedent. The Supreme Court decisions 
illustrate a plain legal inconsistency between domestic law 
and the international resolution of treaty issues.    
 
IV.     AMERICA’S SUBMISSION TO ICJ JURISDICTION:  
1945 – 1969   
 
From the inception of the ICJ in 1945, the international 
community wrought a compromise, hampering its 
jurisdiction. Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice64 [hereinafter “Court’s Statute”] offered 
member states the option to make “declarations” accepting 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction, including reservations that bar the ICJ 
from hearing certain classes of disputes.  Exercising its 
option, the United States declared that it would accede to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ with one reservation, 
known as the Connally Reservation.65 The Connally 
Reservation permits the United States to opt out of ICJ 
jurisdiction over “disputes with regard to matters which are 
                                                 
61 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.128, paras. 127-32 (Mar. 31). 
62 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2677. 
63 Id. 
64 Court’s Statute, supra note 15.  
65 See Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice on August 2, 1946, 92 Cong. Rec. 10, 694-697, Dep’t 
St.Bull., Sept. 1946, at 452-53. 
16         Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law           Vol. 2 
 
  
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United 
States as determined by the United States of America.”66  
In short, the United States undercut the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ by retaining an automatic jurisdictional 
veto over the ICJ in matters deemed to be within America’s 
domestic jurisdiction.  A surge of criticism followed the 
Connally Reservation.  Secretary of State Herter, on behalf of 
the Eisenhower administration, later criticized the Connally 
Reservation: “‘As a world leader, we are setting an 
exceedingly poor example by such [p]arochial action as the 
Connally Amendment.’”67 Scholars continued to call for a 
modification of the 1946 declaration and accept the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ to avoid “denigrating” the 
authority of the Court.68  
In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal 
Year 1978,69 Congress requested the President to prepare a 
report on the reform and restructuring of the United Nations 
system.70  In the report, the President recognized that the 
Connally Reservation “conflicts with the provisions of the 
Court’s Statute71 that the Court shall determine what matters 
are within its jurisdiction….”72 The report recommended 
reinvesting exclusive jurisdiction in the ICJ in order to 
strengthen the use of the ICJ to settle international disputes.73  
                                                 
66 U.S. Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218 (1947), reprinted 
in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE 
SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS ATT 31 DECEMBER 1982, at 
23-24, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/2 (1983).  
67 Close Vote, TIME MAG. (Sept. 12, 1960) available at 
http://205.188.238.109/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,897512,00.html 
(last visited April 27, 2007). 
68 Anthony D’Amato, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L. L. 385, 401-02 (1985). 
69 Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1978, 
Pub.L.No. 95-105, 91 Stat. 844 (1977). 
70 Reform and Restructuring of the U.N. System, Department of State 
Publication 8940 (June 1978) at 5. 
71 Court’s Statute, supra note 15, at Art. 3, para.1. 
72 Reform and Restructuring of the U.N. System, supra note 70, at 17. 
73 Between 1946 and 1978, the United States had committed itself 
without reservation to the jurisdiction of the ICJ of the Court in 34 
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President Carter observed that the Connally Reservation was 
an obstacle to maximizing utilization of the ICJ because “it 
has caused other States to question U.S. confidence in the 
Court, and it (or its equivalent) in other states has been used 
as a means to defeat the Court’s consideration of legal issues 
which are clearly international in character.”74 “The 
Department of State [likewise affirmed that the Connally] 
Reservation d[id] not provide the U.S. with any substantial 
benefit, and every Administration since that of President 
Eisenhower [until the date of the report] urged its repeal.”75 
To this day, however, the Connally Reservation retains 
vitality.76 While the Connally Reservation was not formally 
invoked in any of the cases recently decided by the ICJ, the 
President’s decision to instead completely withdraw from the 
Protocol 77 undermines the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
in every future case, exceeding the more circumscribed and 
already politically disfavored escape route contemplated by 
the Connally Reservation.     
                                                                                                     
multilateral treaties and 21 bilateral agreements with respect to disputes 
arising under them. Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 17-18. 
76 The Interhandel Case (Swit. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. No. 6 (Mar. 21), 
is the only case in which the United States formally exercised the 
Connally Reservation. In that case, Switzerland filed a claim demanding 
the return of certain seized property of the Interhandel corporation. 
Switzerland rejected the application of the reservation finding that a 
disagreement by the parties as to the interpretation of the subject treaty 
was a question of international law and went directly to the merits of the 
case. Because the case was already pending in the United States court, the 
ICJ did not have occasion to rule on the validity of the automatic 
reservation clause.  Interestingly, Bulgaria invoked the Connally 
Reservation on the basis of reciprocity against the United States in Aerial 
Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria, 1960 I.C.J. 146 (May 30).).  
See  Richard Falk, The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard 
Questions, 74 AM. J. INT’L. L. 411(1980). 
77 Article 1 of the Protocol provides: “Disputes arising out of the 
interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention shall lie within 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may 
accordingly be brought before the Court by a written application made by 
any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.” Protocol, 
supra note 48. 
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V. AMERICA’S SUBMISSION TO ICJ JURISDICTION 
IN ARTICLE 36 CASES:  1979  
 
A. United States v Iran: The Legal Position of the 
United States in 1979  
  
The legal position taken by the United States before the 
ICJ in the Iran hostage crisis in 1979 provides the very legal 
basis for accepting ICJ legal precedent with respect to current 
domestic cases raising treaty violations of Article 36.  
Ironically, after Bulgaria invoked the reciprocal application 
of the Connally Reservation against the United States in 
1955, forcing America to withdraw its own claim,78 the Iran 
hostage crisis marked the first time in the succeeding thirty-
five years that the United States turned to the ICJ for 
remediation.79  This move was consistent with America’s 
then foreign policy favoring investiture of exclusive 
jurisdiction in the ICJ over international disputes.80 
The 1979 case relates to the forced takeover of the 
American Embassy in Tehran and the American Consulates 
in Tabriz and Shiraz and the detention of 50 Americans by 
militants.81  To satisfy its prima facie burden to establish the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, the United States primarily relied on 
the identical provisions of the Protocol and Article 1 of the 
Optional Protocols on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
attached to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and 
Consular Relations,82 which provide that: “Disputes arising 
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention 
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
78 Memorandum, supra note 17. 
79 Leo Gross, The Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures, 74 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 395, 410 (1980). 
80 See discussion supra Section II. 
81 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents [hereinafter 
“ICJ Pleadings”]. Republished by The Hague, (1982). 1980 I.C.J. 3, No. 
64 (May 24). 
82 Gross, supra note 79, at 400. 
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International Court of Justice…”   Referring to the VCCR 
and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
(1961 Convention), the ICJ concluded that Article 1 provides 
“in the clearest manner for the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
court.”83 
Then Legal Advisor and Agent to the United States, 
Roberts B. Owen, citing Article 1 of the Protocol, 
unequivocally stated the position of the United States with 
regard to the legal principles of compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ: “Since both States [U.S. and Iran] are parties to the 
Protocol, and since one of them (the United States) has 
presented an application to the Court, Article 1 confers 
mandatory jurisdiction upon the Court.”84 However, having 
established the Court’s jurisdiction, it remained to show that 
the 50 hostages concerned, by their status, were covered by 
the VCCR and the 1961 Convention.  The ICJ was satisfied 
that 48 hostages were covered by the two conventions.  That 
left the status of two private individual hostages to be 
resolved. The ICJ concluded that the Protocol also furnished 
a basis for jurisdiction “with regard to the claims of the 
United States in respect of the two individuals in question.”85 
Thus, the ICJ assumed both subject matter jurisdiction over 
an Article 36 claim as well as jurisdiction over the individual 
hostages who, because of their status under the treaty, were 
subject to treaty protection pursuant to the claim asserted by 
the United States.   
Indeed, the gravamen of America’s complaint before the 
ICJ arising under the VCCR, was unambiguously argued by 
Benjamin Civiletti, then Attorney General and U.S. counsel 
before the ICJ: “The Convention on Consular Relations also 
                                                 
83 Order of the Court, December 15, 1979, para. 17, [1979] ICJ Rep. 
7. reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT’L. L. 266 (1980).  As a caveat, the Court also 
acknowledged that Articles II and III provided alternative avenues for 
settlement and conciliation, respectively, but that the right of unilateral 
arraignment in Article I was in no way modified by Articles II and III. 
This was completely consistent with the position taken by the U.S. during 
the oral argument of Mr. Owen stating that recourse under Articles II and 
III are purely optional. See ICJ Pleadings, supra note 81, para. 27. 
84 ICJ Pleadings, supra note 81,  para. 27. 
85 Order of the Court, supra note 83, paras. 19 and 20, at 271-72. 
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requires the receiving State [Iran] to permit another State’s 
party’s consular officers to communicate with and have 
access to their nationals. The right is manifestly violated 
when the consular officers are themselves held 
incommunicado by force.”86 In fact, a violation of Article 36 
of the VCCR was specifically included as one of the claims 
asserted against Iran and submitted to the ICJ under 
principles of compulsory jurisdiction for adjudication and 
remedial measures.87 There can be no question that the 
United States expected Iran to comply with the ICJ’s 
adjudication of the Article 36 treaty violation with respect to 
American nationals being held as hostages and denied access 
to their consular representatives. 
Accordingly, the State Department’s later justification in 
2005 for divesting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
under the Protocol, in response to the ICJ finding that 
America was in “manifest violation” of Article 36 of the 
VCCR, as a need to “[protect] against future International 
Court of Justice judgments that might similarly interfere in 
ways we did not anticipate when we joined the optional 
protocol,”88 is purely disingenuous. The United States was 
the first country to exercise what it described as the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction to remedy an Article 36 violation 
based on a manifest violation of the VCCR by Iran in 
refusing consular access to a U.S. national.  Not only could 
the United States have anticipated the results in the ICJ 
decisions in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, the United States 
urged the ICJ to adopt that same legal position in its own 
application for relief in the Iran hostage crisis. The ICJ ruled 
exactly in the recent Article 36 cases as the United States had 
asked it to rule during the Iran hostage crisis.   
Based on clear international precedent, the Supreme 
Court should have found that such precedent compelled a 
ruling in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, as opposed to merely 
assuming that an individual foreign national has the right to 
                                                 
86 Supra note 83, para. 23 (emphasis added). 
87 Id. at 8, para. 5(a)  Judgment Requested. 
88 U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, supra note 
56 (emphasis added). 
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raise a treaty violation by state authorities as part of his 
defense. The assumption had the effect of putting off the 
inevitable job of the Supreme Court, advocated by Justice 
Breyer, to comprehensively define and explain the 
relationship between domestic and international courts.89 At 
best, the Court has created strange legal reasoning based on 
some unexplained principle of assumption upon which due 
process rights are not decided by the Court.   
 
VI. A CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
ICJ’S DECISIONS IN THE LAGRAND AND AVENA 
CASES 
 
A. LaGrand and Avena: A Remedy for the Right 
 
The ICJ has repeatedly ruled on the legal obligations of 
the United States under Article 36, in conformity with the 
VCCR and the Protocol. The LaGrand case,90 involving a 
suit by the Germany against the United States, stands for the 
proposition that: the VCCR establishes rights for individuals 
and not just member states;91 domestic procedural default 
rules cannot be applied to nullify treaty rights;92 and it was 
“incumbent” upon the United States93 to provide a remedy for 
an Article 36 violation of its own choosing by means of a 
legally obligatory review and reconsideration of all 
convictions and sentences of affected individuals.  
This was perhaps the first blow to continued participation 
by the United States in the ICJ.  The ICJ’s determination that 
Article 36 created an individually enforceable right under 
treaty was in sharp contrast with American courts that had 
either not resolved the question or expressly rejected the 
enforceability of Article 36 rights under the VCCR by 
                                                 
89 Hon. Stephen Breyer, supra note 12. 
90 LaGrand Case (F.R.G. V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
91 Id. at 494, para. 77. 
92
 Id. at 497, paras. 90-91. 
93 Id. at 513-14, paras. 125-26. (The remedial provisions of the 
decision were stated in mandatory and not advisory terms.) 
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individual foreign nationals in domestic criminal 
proceedings.94 
It was then that the institutional conflict erupted between 
the ICJ, the Supreme Court, and the Arizona Governor.  In 
the wake of the ICJ decision, the Supreme Court and the 
Governor of Arizona refused to recognize the ICJ’s March 3, 
1999 interim order staying LaGrand’s execution, while the 
case was pending before the ICJ for final decision. The ICJ 
then ruled that this refusal evidenced a Protocol violation by 
the United States of its “international legal obligation to 
comply” and “to take all measures at its disposal” to 
effectuate the orders of the ICJ.95  The refusal was a rather 
transparent foreign policy reaction, as opposed to a legal 
response, to the decision. Indeed, the Governor’s refusal to 
honor the ICJ interim order directly contradicted the Arizona 
Clemency Board recommended stay of execution.96  At the 
same time, the Supreme Court denied Germany’s separate 
application to stay execution, although the option of granting 
a preliminary stay was an option available to the Court.97  
This conflict underscored the intransigence of the United 
States where international treaty obligations were not suited 
to domestic policy prerogatives.  Given the Supreme Court’s 
later refusal in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo to even 
acknowledge the law of the case in LaGrand, precluding the 
use of state procedural default rules to nullify treaty rights of 
individuals is in direct conflict with international law.98  The 
                                                 
94 See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Santos, 253 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Lombera-Carmolinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2000); Ledezma 
v.State, 626 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2001); State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904 
(Ohio 2001); Kasi v.Commonwealth,  508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998).  
95 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 508, paras. 115-16. 
96 Id. at 507-08, para. 113. 
97 Id. at 508, para. 114. 
98 Although some may argue that rulings of the ICJ are case specific 
based on the express language of  the Protocol, there is some authority for 
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LaGrand decision was reaffirmed by the ICJ in Avena which 
followed.  
 
B. Creating Binding International Policy  
 
In Avena,99 the ICJ again found multiple violations of 
Article 36 by the United States in fifty-one individual cases 
brought by Mexico.  As a result, the ICJ reaffirmed the 
LaGrand decision100 and ordered the same remedial measures 
including the review and reconsideration of all convictions 
resulting in a lengthy period of incarceration of the subject 
Mexican nationals.101  Then, in an astounding conclusion to 
the opinion, the ICJ escalated the conflict. The ICJ 
concluded, based on the earlier principles articulated in 
LaGrand, its decision established binding legal precedent in 
all future cases involving similarly situated foreign nationals 
in domestic American proceedings: 
 
The Court would now re-emphasize a point of 
importance.  In the present case, it has had 
occasion to examine the obligations of the 
United States under Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention…To avoid any ambiguity, it 
should be made clear that…the Court has been 
addressing the issues of principle raised in the 
course of present proceedings from the 
viewpoint of the general application of the 
Vienna Convention, and there can be no 
question of making an a contrario argument in 
                                                                                                     
the proposition that when the ICJ interprets a multilateral treaty, its 
decision addresses the objective meaning of the treaty which must be 
applied in future cases as having precedential value.  This finds support in 
Article 63 of the ICJ Statute, which requires the ICJ to notify other treaty 
adherents who are non-parties to the case before it when such 
interpretations are issued to allow other members to intervene in the case 
as a matter of right.   
99 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.12,  No. 128 (Mar. 31). 
100 Id. at 44-5, paras. 111-14. 
101 Id. at 51, para. 131. 
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respect of any of the Court’s findings in the 
present Judgment.  In other words, the fact that 
in this case the Court’s ruling has concerned 
only Mexican nationals cannot be taken to 
imply that the conclusions reached by it in the 
present Judgment do not apply to other foreign 
nationals finding themselves in similar 
situations in the United States.102  
 
C. The Resulting Conflict of Law 
 
 While much has been written about these two decisions, 
nothing seemed to predict the Supreme Court’s next move in 
the aftermath of these cases. Indeed, there has been almost no 
mention about that aspect of the ICJ decision which 
ostensibly binds domestic courts and state governments to the 
interpretation and application of Article 36 by the ICJ in all 
future cases.  Clearly, the Supreme Court had no interest or 
involvement in the development of international law under 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.  Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court behaved in its own later decisions as if the 
United States was a disinterested party.  The thinking turned 
out to be particularly short-sighted in view of America’s later 
foreign policy decision to withdraw from the Protocol in 
2005, resulting in Article 36 disputes being handed back to 
the Supreme Court, but only after international legal 
precedent had been firmly decided by the ICJ.   
 
D.  2007 Update: Medellin Returns to the Supreme 
Court 
 
 The legal mess continues to escalate.  The Texas court 
flatly refused to apply the ICJ decision in Avena to defendant 
Medellin’s case on remand, despite the President’s 
Memorandum of February 2005 obligating the United States 
to do so.  The Texas court concluded that it did not construe 
the constitutional provisions as expressly or implicitly 
                                                 
102 Id. at 57, para. 151. 
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granting the President the authority to mandate state court 
compliance with the ICJ Avena decision. 103  
 Undoubtedly, Justice Breyer saw the proverbial 
handwriting on the wall when he emphasized the critical need 
to decide these issues with full consideration of the legal 
relationships between the ICJ and American courts.104  It 
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will embrace 
the task on the second visit of the Medellin case to its 
chambers.105  
 
VII. VI. AMERICA’S RETREAT FROM THE 
PROTOCOL:  IS ICJ PRECEDENT BINDING?  
 
A. The Political Dispute Dividing the U.S. and the 
ICJ 
 
The political controversy, that may explain the Supreme 
Court’s issue avoidance behavior, arises out of a fundamental 
disagreement between the executive branch of the United 
States government and the ICJ about the right of individual 
defendants, under international agreements, to assert 
violations of treaty rights in American courts.  On one hand, 
the Government claims that there is a long-established 
presumption that treaties and other international agreements 
do not create individual judicially enforceable rights.106  
Hence, a foreign national may not claim in an American court 
that a state has convicted him in violation of treaty 
provisions.  Under these circumstances, the best that a 
detained foreign national defendant can hope for is a non-
judicial remedy such as post-conviction clemency or 
reparations. 107 In his dissent in Sanchez-Llamas, Justice 
                                                 
103 Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L. 3302639 (Tex. 
Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2007).   
104 Hon. Stephen Breyer, supra note 12. 
105 Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984). 
106 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin v. Dretke, 
O.T. 2004, No. 04-5928, at 11.   
107 Id. at 7. 
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Breyer rejected the government’s claim regarding any such 
presumption, stating, “that no such presumption exists.” 108 
In opposition, the ICJ has consistently rejected the United 
States’ claim that treaty rights may only be enforced by 
member states to the treaty, and not individuals.109 Consistent 
with its interpretation that a specific treaty may provide an 
individually enforceable right to raise a violation, the ICJ 
acknowledged that any remedial measures must be left to the 
domestic laws of the member states consistent with each 
nation’s autonomy under international law.110  However, the 
member state does have an affirmative obligation under the 
Protocol to remediate treaty violations.111 Thus, the ICJ 
firmly concluded that the Vienna Convention creates 
judicially enforceable rights, with the concomitant obligation 
of each member state to provide the appropriate judicial 
remedy to vindicate the violation of the right.112 
 
B. The Impact of Forum Selection Clauses on the 
Binding Affect of International Law  
 
Article 59 of the Court’s Statute 113 provides that a 
decision of the ICJ has no binding force except between the 
                                                 
108 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2697 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
109 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. 
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.128, paras. 121, 128 (Mar. 31);  LaGrand Case (F.R.G. 
V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, para. 125 (June 27).  
110 VCCR, supra  note 2, at Art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T., at 101, (laws and 
regulations “must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which 
the rights accorded under this Article are intended.”). 
111 Id. 
112 The difficulty of achieving uniformity in remedial action among 
the various member states is discussed at point D infra.  See also Miriam 
Miquelon-Weismann, The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized 
Implementation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for 
Procedural Due Process? 23 J. MARSHALL. J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.329, 
357 (2005). (“Whether a particular party has enacted sufficient due 
process protections, or even extends existing domestic due process 
protections to aliens prosecuted within its borders, must necessarily 
remain untested until cases are actually prosecuted.”)  
113 Court’s Statute, supra note 15.  
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parties and in respect to that particular case.114  Thus, the 
legal principle of stare decisis does not exist in the traditional 
sense in international law.115 However, the Supreme Court 
has continually recognized the utility and enforceability of 
forum selection clauses under international law, such as the 
Protocol, even assuming that “‘a contrary legal result would 
be forthcoming in a domestic context.’”116 The policy 
considerations of meeting international expectations of 
predictability and uniformity as the basis to enforce a 
voluntary agreement between the parties to submit to 
international or foreign authority under a forum selection 
clause was emphasized by the Court: “We cannot have trade 
and commerce in world markets and international waters 
exclusively on our own terms, governed by our laws, and 
resolved in our courts.”117  
In the context of the VCCR and the utility of the Protocol 
as a forum selection clause, the Court observed that it should 
“give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an 
international treaty rendered by an international court with 
jurisdiction to interpret such.”118  In early dicta in the Breard 
decision, the Court assumed without deciding that the VCCR 
“arguably confers on an individual the right to consular 
assistance following arrest…”119 This language may be 
something short of wholesale approval of ICJ interpretation 
of Article 36 as binding legal precedent, however, there is 
recognition that this interpretation cannot and should not be 
ignored.  
Apparently, the fact that the Supreme Court continually 
assumes without deciding that Article 36 confers individually 
                                                 
114 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 103, cmt (b) 
(1987). 
115 Id. 
116 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985). 
117 Bremen v. Zapatta Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). 
118 Greene v. Gilmore, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).  
119 Id. at 376. Greene’s claim under the VCCR based on an Article 36 
violation was rejected on other procedural grounds. Parenthetically, the 
ruling based upon an interpretation of a state’s procedural default rules 
has also been subsequently rejected by the ICJ. 
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enforceable rights upon foreign nationals in domestic 
proceedings implies that the Court continues to apply the 
standard of “respectful consideration” to ICJ decisions.  
Arguably, the correct standard for the Court to apply is not 
“respectful consideration” but actual recognition of the ICJ 
order interpreting the treaty and establishing international 
policy as being dispositive of the issue. This would be 
consistent with the history of the negotiations leading up to 
the codification of a forum selection clause under the 
Protocol, the post-ratification conduct and legal position 
espoused by the United States in cases before the ICJ relating 
to Article 36 interpretation, and the prior decisions of the 
Supreme Court120 enforcing forum selection clauses entered 
into voluntarily by the parties. 
 
C. ICJ Decisions Should Be Treated as Binding 
Interpretation of Article 36 Based on the 
Negotiated Agreement Between Sovereigns 
 
The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that a treaty 
ratified by the United States is the law of the land.121 
representing an agreement among sovereign powers.122 As 
such, the Court has considered as aids to treaty interpretation 
the negotiating and drafting history and the post-ratification 
understanding of the parties.123 
The negotiating and drafting history demonstrates that the 
United States played a major role in negotiating the specific 
language of the VCCR and the Protocol.124 The United 
States’ fully supported the Protocol, with the understanding 
that members would be free to accept or reject the Protocol.  
However, once accepted, members were bound by its 
                                                 
120 Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,  473 U.S. at 629; Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. 
121 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 
122 Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996). 
123 Id. 
124 Report of the United States Delegation to the Vienna Conference 
on Consular Relations, reprinted in Sen. Exec. E., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 
May 8, 1969 at 41, 59-61. 
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operation,125 including Article 1126 of the Protocol which 
places the adjudication of treaty interpretation squarely 
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The United 
States voluntarily accepted the Protocol when it ratified the 
VCCR in 1969 127 and has continued in the post-ratification 
period to be bound voluntarily by its operation until 2005, 
when the United States withdrew.128 
Moreover, the United States argued before the ICJ during 
the Iran hostage crisis that the failure to provide consular 
access under Article 36 is a manifest violation of the treaty.129  
The ICJ agreed and has repeatedly issued decisions consistent 
with that interpretation of the VCCR. There is no legal 
authority to suggest that a foreign policy decision by the 
executive branch to withdraw from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ somehow voids international legal 
principles and an entire line of cases decided by the ICJ while 
the United States voluntarily submitted itself to the 
jurisdiction of that Court and urged the Court to embrace 
those same legal principles.   
While the Supreme Court did not explicitly enforce ICJ 
interpretation of Article 36 in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, it 
must assume (without deciding) that it is the law.  The Court 
is at a loss of both words and logic to find otherwise.  
 
D. Binding State Courts to ICJ Precedent Post-
Protocol  
 
It is axiomatic that the constitution of the United States130 
declares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land and its 
obligations are binding on the courts of the United States.131 
                                                 
125 Id. at 72-73. 
126 Protocol, supra note 48. See also supra text accompanying note 
77. 
127 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 3. 
128 Court’s Statute, supra note 15; see also supra note 16.  
129 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran, supra note 81. 
130 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2. 
131 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-10 
(1801). 
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The VCCR is a self-executing treaty requiring no domestic 
legislation to make it operative.132 Self-executing treaties 
have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.133 The 
Supreme Court early recognized that the Constitution places 
self-executing treaties in the same category as other laws of 
Congress that create rights “capable of enforcement as 
between private parties.”134  
Both James Madison135 and John Jay136 emphasized the 
importance of federal supremacy over state and local 
governments in foreign affairs.  Likewise, the Supreme 
Court, early recognized federal supremacy in the field of 
foreign affairs: “Plainly, the external powers of the United 
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or 
policies.  The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been 
recognized from the beginning.”137  So, what happens to the 
rules governing federal supremacy after the United States 
withdraws from a Protocol?  
The question now certain to be presented to the Supreme 
Court on a petition for writ of certiorari, arising out of the 
recent decision by the state of Texas,138 is whether the 
President of the United States can bind state courts post-
protocol to follow ICJ precedent by virtue of a presidential 
memorandum submitted to the ICJ committing the states to 
do so.  The Texas court seemed to think that presidential 
memoranda were not included in the group of documents, 
such as treaties and protocols, categorically included under 
                                                 
132 S. Exec. Rep. No.91-9 app. at 5 (1969) (statement of Deputy Legal 
Advisor J. Edward Lyerly). See, e.g., Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.2d 615,622 
(4th Cir. 1988). 
133 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
134 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). 
135 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). The power to make treaties and regulate commerce 
with foreign powers was seen as an “obvious and essential branch of 
federal administration.” Id.  
136 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
137 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). 
138 Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984). 
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the federal supremacy clause and other case precedent 
declaring federal superiority in the field.139  In other words, 
the Texas court found that the withdrawal from the Protocol 
left the President without the power to bind the states to ICJ 
orders.  It is probably fair to say that neither the President in 
issuing the 2005 Memorandum nor the Supreme Court 
anticipated this legal result as a consequence of withdrawing 
from the Protocol.   
While this issue may provide future scholars with fertile 
ground for comment, the short answer to a relatively lengthy 
opinion may be that the Texas court simply overlooked the 
meaning of the word “treaty.”  
The Supreme Court observed long ago: 
 
[N]egotiations, acceptance of the assignment 
and agreements and understandings  in 
respect thereof were within the competence of 
the President may not be  doubted… an 
international compact, as this was, is not 
always a treaty which requires the 
participation of the Senate. There are many 
such compacts, of which  a protocol, a modus 
vivendi, a postal convention and [commercial] 
agreements  like that under consideration 
are illustrations… [the commercial agreement] 
was a  compact negotiated and proclaimed 
under the authority of the President, and as 
such was a ‘treaty’…140  
 
Presumably, the commitment made by the President to 
the ICJ pursuant to presidential memorandum fits into the 
seemingly broad penumbra of illustrations defining the 
meaning of “treaty.”141 
                                                 
139 Id.  
140 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31. 
141 Parenthetically, a good deal more can be said about the Texas 
case. For example, the case completely ignores legal considerations 
attendant to international decisions rendered under compulsory forum 
selection clauses like the one in the Protocol. 
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In any case, as a direct result of the decision to withdraw 
from the Protocol, state courts have refused to follow ICJ 
orders regarding the impact of an Article 36 violation on the 
criminal conviction of a foreign national.  The Supreme Court 
should not assume without deciding that such a right exists.  
The treatment of foreign nationals in American courts should 
not turn on an argument over the authority of the President to 
make the states comply with international law.  In a country 
that prides itself on the principle of legality, where the law as 
opposed to personal predilection governs the outcome of a 
case, mere assumptions of the Supreme Court about the due 
process rights of foreign nationals fall short.142       
 
VIII. THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN VINDICATING 
ENFORCEABLE LEGAL RIGHTS  
 
Based upon the Supreme Court’s refusal in Sanchez-
Llamas to apply the exclusionary rule to protect the rights of 
foreign nationals, where the violation of those rights is 
conceded, or to prevent state procedural default rules from 
barring remediation, the issue of extending existing domestic 
due process protections to foreign nationals prosecuted within 
America’s borders remains unclear.  The Supreme Court 
should finally decide the application of international law to 
domestic legal proceedings.  The need for this final 
determination is critical because of the general nature of 
international treaty enforcement mechanisms. Under most 
treaties, the dynamic of self-enforcement of the treaty 
objectives remains within the domain of each respective 
national legislature.  That is particularly the case under the 
                                                 
142 One aspect of the principle of legality is the notion that the courts 
may not engage in the “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the 
penal law and [the] resort to legal formalism as a constraint against 
unbridled discretion.” John Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the 
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 201 (1985).  The 
ambivalence shown by the Supreme Court with regard to the orders of the 
ICJ and the refusal to articulate any legal standard against which to 
provide foreign nationals notice of their rights in American courts is the 
precise kind of arbitrary judicial rule-making sought to be precluded by 
the principle of legality. 
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VCCR.  ICJ orders require remediation in conformity with 
international obligations pursuant to the VCCR but permit 
each member state to fashion remedial measures according to 
each member’s own legislative and judicial preferences. 
Also central to the model of procedural due process in the 
international sphere is the mandate that all nations recognize:   
 
[R]ights arising pursuant to obligations it has 
undertaken under the 1950 Council of Europe 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental  Freedoms [ECHR], 
the 1966 United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and  Political Rights, and 
other applicable international human rights 
instruments, and  which shall incorporate the 
principle of proportionality.143   
 
However, Supreme Court decisions have historically 
treated these mandates with plain indifference.  For example, 
in rejecting an alien’s claim for damages under the Aliens 
Tort Statute arising out of an alleged arbitrary arrest and 
unlawful seizure,144 the Supreme Court concluded that neither 
the ECHR nor the other international treaties imposed any 
legal obligation on the United States.  Therefore, federal 
courts had no power to enforce individual rights violations 
                                                 
143 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, at Art. 15, para. 1. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm, (last visited 
May 29, 2007). 
144 The petitioner was acquitted on charges arising out of the torture 
and murder of a DEA agent by Mexican nationals.  The Ninth Circuit 
found, in a related lower court decision, Alvarez-Machain v. United 
States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2003)., that DEA agents had no 
authority under federal law to execute an extra-territorial arrest of the 
petitioner indicted in a federal court in Los Angeles.  In fact, the agents 
unlawfully kidnapped petitioner to bring him to the United States to stand 
trial.  Petitioner moved to dismiss his indictment based upon “outrageous 
government conduct” and a violation of the extradition treaty with 
Mexico.  The district court agreed, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the 
Supreme Court reversed holding that the forcible seizure did not divest 
the federal court of jurisdiction.  United States v. Alavrez, 504 U.S. 655 
(1992). 
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under these treaties, even where the United States was a 
signatory.  
The Court observed: 
 
[Petitioner] says that his abduction by [DEA 
operatives] was an ‘arbitrary arrest’ within the 
meaning of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Declaration), G.A. Res. 
217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).  And he 
traces the rule against arbitrary arrest not only 
to the Declaration, but also to article nine of 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Covenant), Dec. 19, 1996, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, to which the United States 
is a party, and to various other conventions to 
which it is not.  But the Declaration does not 
of its own force impose obligations as a matter 
of international law […] [a]nd, although the 
Covenant does not bind the United States as a 
matter of international law, the United States 
ratified the Covenant on the express 
understanding that it was not self-executing 
and so did not itself create obligations 
enforceable in the federal courts.145 
 
Thus, the ECHR, along with the other human rights 
treaties, apparently creates no enforceable procedural due 
process rights in United States federal courts. 
Moreover, the decision to extend the protections of the 
Bill of Rights to aliens is not an automatic one or implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty. Specifically, the Supreme 
Court declined to extend the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment to an alien extradited to the United States for 
trial on criminal charges.  The Court reasoned that “...aliens 
receive constitutional protections when they have come 
within the territory of the United States and developed 
substantial connections with this country...but this sort of 
                                                 
145 Sosa v. Alavrez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004). 
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presence-lawful but involuntary [extradition]- is not the sort 
to indicate any substantial connection with our country.”146  
Further rejecting the alien’s equal protection argument, to 
wit: that aliens should be afforded the same constitutional 
rights afforded U.S. citizens in criminal cases, the Court 
concluded: “They are constitutional decisions of this Court 
expressly according different protections to aliens than to 
citizens, based on our conclusion that the particular 
provisions in question were not intended to extend to aliens in 
the same degree as to citizens.”147  Justice Kennedy, in his 
concurring opinion, concludes that: “The distinction between 
citizens and aliens follows from the undoubted proposition 
that the Constitution does not create, nor do general 
principles of law create, any judicial relation between our 
country and some undefined, limitless class of non-citizens 
who are beyond our territory.”148  
These decisions leave little doubt that the Bill of Rights 
does not operate extraterritorially in relation to searches and 
seizures or in relation to constitutional infringements of the 
right to privacy. The proposed application of these rights to 
remediate Article 36 violations seems equally unlikely.  
Instead, the Court extends existing procedural due process 
guarantees to aliens on the two-prong voluntariness and 
substantial connection analysis.  That ad hoc determination 
leaves little room for predictability in the application of the 
treaty in the United States.  
Accordingly, the procedural due process rhetoric of the 
ICJ warning against the application of state procedural 
default rules as a bar to remediation of treaty violations had 
no demonstrable influence on American jurisprudence as 
evidenced by the decision in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo. 
The Supreme Court’s adherence to depriving foreign 
nationals of procedural due process in these decisions, 
reaffirming the principles of Breard, flies in the face of the 
Golden Rule of foreign relations. Indeed, the United States 
                                                 
146 United States v. Verfugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) 
(emphasis added). 
147  Id. 
148 Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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should expect no more protection with respect to its citizens 
similarly situated in other nations. In view of decision to 
withdraw completely from the treaty, American citizens will 
have no ability to rely on the protections of Article 36 once in 
custody in another country. The cycle of international 
mistrust is inevitably self-perpetuating under these 
circumstances.  Thus, even recognition of a judicially 
enforceable treaty right may be only a pyrrhic victory.  What 
is an enforceable right without a remedy? 
 
IX. NATIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The United States State Department recognizes the 
importance of consular access to American citizens arrested 
abroad.  The Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual provides, 
“[O]ur most important function as consular officers is to 
protect and assist private U.S. citizens or nationals traveling 
or residing abroad.  Few of our citizens need that assistance 
more than those who have been arrested in a foreign country 
or imprisoned in a foreign jail.”149 The Department’s Foreign 
Affairs Manual describes the VCCR as “ the most important 
legislative and administrative authorities for providing 
assistance to U.S. citizens or nationals who are detained, 
arrested or imprisoned abroad….”150 The importance of 
maximizing human rights, due process, and quick consular 
access, is a clearly stated foreign policy goal.  Yet, there is a 
real disconnect in the Supreme Court between upholding 
America’s obligations under treaty and the foreign policy 
goal of obtaining fair treatment for U.S. citizens under the 
same legal document. The maxim “do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you”151 has become enormously 
problematic.  Remarkably, the Foreign Relations Manual 
includes an entire section about how U.S. consular officers 
should respond to the complaints of other host governments 
                                                 
149 7 Foreign Assistance Manual (FAM) §412  Policy, at 1 (Sept. 1, 
2004). http://foia.state.gov/masterdocs/07fam/07fam0410.pdf  (last visited 
April 24, 2007).  
150 Id. §413-Authority, at 2. 
151 Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a. 
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that America does not honor its obligations under Article 36: 
“Even where this might be true, it does not exempt the host 
government from its treaty obligations.  Two wrongs do not 
make a right.”
152 
While an almost laughable retort, the notion that 
America’s own misbehavior should not excuse the behavior 
of other member states, demonstrates the same disregard for 
America’s obligations under the VCCR as that exhibited by 
the executive and judicial branches of government. 
Reciprocal treaty violations which cannot be remedied by the 
extension of basic procedural due process rights to detained 
foreign nationals only serves to underscore the confusion 
embedded in America’s foreign policy contributed to by the 
Court’s decisions.  
Justice Breyer observed in his dissent in Sanchez-Llamas 
that the United States joined the VCCR in order to promote 
the orderly and effective conduct of consular relations 
between member states and to guarantee protection to 
American citizens abroad.153 The difficulty in achieving these 
goals poses a difficult question where enforcement depends 
upon “the details of a nation’s legal system”154 because 
treaties do not include enforcement details which are left to 
member state preferences. “Yet, without any such guarantees 
it may prove difficult to prevent an individual nation, through 
application of its system’s details, from denying in practice 
the rights that the treaty sought to assure.”155 
 
X. CONCLUSION:  THE GOLDEN RULE 
 
The current state of the law has fomented a quagmire of 
legal and political turf battles over the authority to interpret 
and apply international law in domestic criminal proceedings.  
The aspirational goal of providing even legal footing for all 
foreign nationals, including our own citizens, is the most 
                                                 
152 FAM, supra note 149, §420-Notification, at 3 (Sept. 3, 2004) 
(emphasis added).  
153 Sanchez-Llamas, supra note 108, at 2708. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
38         Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law           Vol. 2 
 
  
salient feature of the VCCR. Yet, the Court remains 
indifferent to the inevitable need to establish working 
international relations shored up by domestic legal systems.  
Justice Breyer warns that a system which denies procedural 
due process to foreign nationals is one that: 
 
…leaves States free to deny effective relief for 
Convention violations, despite America’s 
promise to provide just such relief. That 
approach risks weakening respect abroad for 
the right of foreign nationals… And it 
increases the difficulties faced by the United 
States and other nations who would, through 
binding treaties, strengthen the role that law 
can play in assuring all citizens, including 
American citizens, fair treatment throughout 
the world.156 
 
America’s foreign policy goals cannot be limited to 
spreading democracy abroad.  Instead, the goal should be to 
enliven the principles of human rights for all citizens of the 
world even when those foreign nationals seek protections in 
this home. 
 
                                                 
156 Id. at 2709. 
